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57 
Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law 
David Boies* 
The rule of law provides two basic protections against arbitrary or 
discriminatory government action. It provides that the rule applied to 
a particular case must be reasonably predictable. And it provides that 
the rule must be predictable without regard for the identity of the 
parties. We know the importance that the rule of law has for our 
society, our democracy, and the kind of civilization we want, but we 
rarely take the time to think about what the components of the rule of 
law are and how we assure that the rule of law continues. Why has 
this country been successful—much more successful than most 
societies—in preserving the rule of law? How can we continue to be 
successful? How can we lead societies emerging into the democratic 
arena to adopt the rule of law and then protect and preserve it?  
America, of course, did not invent the rule of law. The rule of law 
as a principle, philosophical and otherwise, has been in existence for 
centuries. Philosophers and legal scholars have talked about it, 
written about it, and attempted to implement it. But the American 
democratic experiment made two important contributions to the rule 
of law: one was the principle of judicial supremacy and the other was 
the principle of judicial independence.  
I. THE RULE OF LAW, JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, AND JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
More than two hundred years ago, when our democracy began, 
the principles of judicial supremacy and judicial independence were 
not intuitively obvious. No other society in existence at that time had 
them.  
 
 * Tyrell Williams Lecture at Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (Nov. 
15, 2005). Minimal footnotes have been added. 
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The principle of judicial independence at the federal level was 
written into the Constitution when it was decided that we would 
appoint, rather than elect, our federal judges,1 and give them lifetime 
tenure to remove them from the political process.2 Shortly thereafter 
the Supreme Court, particularly in Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions 
(namely Marbury v. Madison3), articulated the principle of judicial 
supremacy. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions was the province of judges. 
Judicial independence and judicial supremacy work together in an 
attempt to guarantee that the rule of law will not be eroded by the 
political pressures in existence at any particular point in time. By 
removing the ultimate interpretation of constitutional provisions from 
elected officials, the principle of judicial supremacy reduces the 
likelihood that basic legal protections will fall victim to the passions 
of the moment. Insulating judges from political influence advances 
the same objective. Of course, neither the principle of judicial 
supremacy nor the principle of judicial independence guarantees the 
rule of law, as the cases of Scott v. Sandford4 and Korematsu v. 
United States5 remind us. Nevertheless, they are important 
underpinnings to the rule of law which we cannot afford to take for 
granted. 
The principle of judicial independence is particularly under attack 
today. We all remember the Terri Schiavo case, and we all remember 
the criticism and the attacks that were directed at the probate judge in 
Florida who, quite contrary to his personal beliefs, decided the case 
the way he believed Florida law required him to decide it. This 
decision was affirmed by a series of appellate courts, both in the state 
and federal judicial system. For making that decision the judge was 
subjected to an unceasing series of personal attacks by legislators in 
the state of Florida and in the Congress of the United States. Rather 
than try to change the law, which they had the power to do, these 
legislators attacked the judge for interpreting the law according to the 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 2. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
 3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 4. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 5. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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way it was written. This kind of attack undercuts more than the 
reputation of an individual judge; this kind of attack undercuts the 
premise of our judicial system: judicial independence and respect for 
the judiciary.  
Ted Olson, who is a wonderful friend and a great lawyer, was 
among a number of the people from his party who were fighting these 
attacks on the judiciary during the Terri Schiavo case. He was very 
forthright in standing up for the principle of judicial independence 
and deserves a lot of credit for that. The same was true for the former 
solicitor general, Ken Starr, who joined me on a number of occasions 
in trying to prevent these attacks and in trying to counter them. This 
is not a republican or democratic issue. It is not a partisan issue. It is 
an issue of judicial independence which is important to all citizens, 
and particularly to all lawyers. Our profession has both an interest 
and an obligation to stand up for the principle of judicial 
independence when these kinds of attacks are made on judges and the 
judicial system, especially because judges, by virtue of the 
constraints on their conduct and comments, are in an extremely poor 
position to defend themselves. 
The average person on the street often does not understand about 
the importance of judicial independence to the preservation of the 
rule of law. It is up to the legal profession, teachers and practicing 
lawyers to try to fill that gap, and to support and explain the role and 
significance of a judiciary independent from partisan pressure. 
Neither an individual judge nor judges generally can defend the 
principle of judicial independence—particularly when it is both the 
most difficult and the most important to do so, which is in the middle 
of a controversial issue. We, as lawyers, also tend to shy away from 
being involved in controversial, political issues. We are much more at 
home arguing our cases in the courtrooms. But this is an issue that we 
know is fundamental to the preservation of the legal system that has 
given us, and our society, so much. Unless we are prepared to defend 
the principle of judicial independence when it is under attack, even in 
the most controversial circumstances, that principle of judicial 
independence will not be available when we most need it. 
Think about the developments in this country, in civil rights and 
in other human rights, which have been accomplished over the last 
half-century. Try to imagine how those could have occurred on 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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anything like the timetable on which they did occur without an 
independent judiciary emboldened with the power to enforce dormant 
constitutional rights. Think, for example, how long it would have 
taken to articulate and enforce the principles of Brown v. Board of 
Education6 if we had waited for state or federal legislators to pass 
legislation supporting equal rights for African Americans. It was the 
principal of judicial supremacy that empowered the courts to declare 
the meaning and scope of the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection,7 and it was the principle of judicial independence that 
protected the courts enough to allow the effective exercise of those 
powers. This was not accomplished easily. Some people, who are as 
old as I am, remember the round-the-clock guards that various judges 
in the Deep South required as a result of their enforcement of the 
Supreme Court’s mandate. That was an attack on judicial 
independence. It was an attack that was met at that time by the 
executive branch, legislators, and the organized Bar; and as a result 
we were able to move this country in a most remarkable way.  
However, there is still much to be done to eliminate the vestiges 
of discrimination. Those of us who have watched this country change 
over the last half-century recognize the importance of the judiciary in 
accomplishing that change, and the essential contribution of judicial 
independence and judicial supremacy in making that change possible. 
As I mentioned earlier, reliance on judicial supremacy and 
independence to foster the rule of law was not necessarily inevitable 
at the time of the early development of our constitutional principles. 
An alternative to judicial supremacy could have been to leave 
interpretation to the legislature. A compromise approach was to say 
that the courts should enforce those principles that guaranteed a 
democratically elected legislature but that once you had guaranteed 
these principles a democratic legislature ought to make the 
determinations of the reach and interpretation of substantive 
constitutional protections. In a democratic society the compromise 
approach has some power, some force, and some persuasiveness. If 
you have a democratically elected legislature why is it not better to 
 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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permit these representatives, whom the people have chosen, to 
interpret the Constitution rather than unelected judges? 
I suggest to you that, based on two centuries of experience, the 
decision two hundred years ago not to divide the power of final 
constitutional interpretation between the judiciary and elected 
officials was the right decision, and that it was the right decision for 
two reasons. First, it is very hard to draw the line between what is 
necessary to secure a democratically elected legislature and what 
issues involve other constitutional concerns. One reason that it is hard 
to find the exact line is that so many of the decisions concerning 
human and civil rights center on the effectiveness of participation in 
our democracy. For example, throughout the period of de jure 
segregation all people of all races were theoretically entitled to 
participate at the polls. The problem was that the other aspects of 
discrimination in society made it impossible for African Americans 
to actually exercise the theoretical franchise that they had. You could 
look at a case like Brown8 and say that it is not part of guaranteeing a 
democratic political process; it does not go to the right to vote; it does 
not go to accessing voting lists; it does not go to who can run as a 
candidate; and so you ought to allow that issue to be decided by 
legislators and not by the courts. The point that is missing is that if 
you do not have equal educational opportunities and equal, related 
rights (whatever your theoretical access to democratic procedures, 
access to voting, access to running for office) your access to the 
democratic political process is unlikely to be effective. That was, in 
fact, the case during the period of segregation. As such, the first 
reason I think it was right for Judge Marshall and the early Supreme 
Court not to fragment the principle of judicial supremacy is because 
it is very difficult, in practice, to distinguish between those cases that 
are required for the preservation of democratic institutions and those 
that are not.  
The second reason why I believe the decision not to divide the 
power of final constitutional interpretation between the judiciary and 
elected officials was correct is that we, as a society, believe that part 
of the rule of law is not only majority rule but also the preservation of 
 
 8. Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
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certain minority rights. Even if you have a democratically elected 
legislature which makes a decision there is concern if that decision 
infringes on the rights of a minority so that it offends basic 
constitutional guarantees. This is something that ought to be 
protected against—regardless of the democratic will at any point in 
time. This, in turn, requires independence from the political process. 
Legislators cannot do this because if they do not abide by the will of 
the people they will be replaced by legislators who will.  
The ability of judges to interpret the law free from the political 
pressures of the moment is dependent on the interpretation of the role 
that they bring to the bench, the extent to which (and the time 
schedule on which) they can be replaced, and the nature of the attacks 
that follow unpopular decisions. The genius of the American judicial 
system’s implementation of the rule of law is that it has coupled the 
principle of judicial supremacy with the principle of judicial 
independence; the latter enables judges to fulfill the function that the 
former gives them. 
II. THE INFLUENCE ON THE RULE OF LAW BY JUDGES AND JURORS 
Public hostility to the principle of judicial supremacy and 
independence in the face of unpopular decisions is not the only 
obstacle to the rule of law. Perhaps the two greatest potential 
obstacles to the rule of law in the United States are judges and jurors. 
Even with all of the best constitutional protections of judicial 
independence and judicial supremacy we will not fulfill the promise 
of the rule of law if judges and juries do not do their job. 
Remember, the rule of law has two components. One is that the 
result in a particular situation should be reasonably predictable. You 
should know what the rule of law is and you should know it in 
advance. The second principle is that the result should be predictable 
independent of the identity of the parties.  
In the Deep South in the 1930s and 1940s it was reasonably 
predictable that in a lawsuit between a Caucasian and an African 
American, the Caucasian was going to win. That did not make it 
consistent with the rule of law. The result was predictable, but it was 
not predictable independent of the identity of the parties. Even today, 
in some jurisdictions, the identity of the party is very important to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/5
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juries; sometimes it is even important to judges. One of the struggles 
that we have in making the rule of law a real, practical protection 
instead of a theoretical protection is to try to make the judges and the 
juries as consistent as possible in the way that they approach the 
resolution of legal disputes.  
As far as judges are concerned improving quality and consistency 
is directly related to how we entice and retain the best judges, 
particularly on the state courts. We need to do more to recruit and 
retain the best judges for the federal bench as well. Because of the 
prestige of the federal bench we have been surprising successful in 
getting lawyers to leave much easier, and more lucrative, positions to 
accept the burden of judging, and to continue in that position despite 
many other alternatives. This is much harder to do in state courts 
where the demand for judges is much larger and often there is less 
prestige and even less money. One of the things that we as a society 
must do if we believe in the rule of law, and if we believe in judicial 
independence, is to be prepared to pay the money necessary to recruit 
and retain the best people available for the judiciary. If you think 
about the costs of injustice in the system, if you think about the extent 
to which the vagaries of the American justice system continue to 
plague individuals and corporations in this country, I think that you 
can see that it would be a relatively small and very worthwhile 
investment to invest more money into getting and keeping the very 
best people in the judiciary. Judging has historically been, and ought 
to be in the future, the highest aspiration of every lawyer. In order to 
assure this we have to preserve the prestige of judging; we have to 
preserve the ability of people to take these jobs while not suffering 
economically. 
It is also important that we demand the highest level of integrity 
from those persons to whom we entrust the awesome power of 
judging—and that the Bar and public, as well as appellate courts and 
legislatures, enforce that demand. Just as it is important for lawyers 
to defend judicial independence in the face of a public uproar over an 
unpopular decision, it is equally important to speak out when judges, 
either through bias, incompetence, cronyism, or, in rare cases, 
outright corruption, abuse their power and position. The vast majority 
of judges, state and federal, are honest, qualified, and dedicated 
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public servants. However, those that are not damage our justice 
system, and the public’s faith in it, disproportionately. 
Lawyers are disinclined to criticize judges, even in the worst 
cases. In part, this has to do with the natural, and desirable, respect 
that we are trained and inclined to give judges. In part, this is due to 
the fact that one side may be happy with the result, however obtained, 
and the other side may not want to appear a sore loser. In part, this is 
due to the fact that if we plan to continue to practice law we have to 
take into account that it is likely that not only the judge criticized but 
other judges as well will usually take umbrage at the suggestion that 
one of them lacks integrity or competence. Too many judges appear 
to believe that recognizing the faults of any one of them damages the 
judiciary generally. I suggest it is the opposite. 
The other obstacle to the rule of law is juries. Suppose you had a 
difficult question involving complicated economic and technological 
issues that you wanted help in deciding. And you came to me and I 
told you that the way we were going to decide it was this: 
We are going to go out in the street. We are going to pick 
twelve people at random who do not know anything about your 
subject. Indeed, if we find somebody who knows something 
about your subject we are going to tell them to get lost. We are 
then going to put them in a room and we are going to tell them 
that they cannot look anything up in books, they cannot use the 
Internet, they cannot talk to friends, and they cannot do any 
investigation at all to help them find an answer to your 
question. These people are going to go into another room 
where they are going to listen to people ask and answer 
questions. Neither the people asking nor the people answering 
the questions are picked by the deciders and there is no 
requirement that either the asker or the answerers be neutral. 
And the deciders are not going to be able to ask any questions 
themselves. If they are unclear about something they must wait 
until somebody happens to clear it up or remain confused. 
Moreover, the parties cannot give them anything in writing that 
explains their position. 
I suggest to you that if somebody told you this you would say, “I’m 
going to find a different way.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/5
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We have a jury system in this country for many great reasons. 
Jurors are actually extremely good at doing some things, and one of 
them is figuring out who is, and who is not, telling the truth. The real 
problem in our cases is that often they do not come down to such a 
simple question. Not only do we have conflicting witnesses, we have 
very complicated issues and it is not merely a question of trying to 
decide who is lying and who is not lying. And juries need help.  
I am not an advocate of eliminating the jury system, although we 
are about the only country in the world that uses the jury system 
today for complicated civil cases, though such use has been 
decreasing in areas like patent law. What I am an advocate of is 
trying to make the jury system better by giving the jurors more of the 
tools that we can provide to facilitate their arrival at the right result in 
complicated cases. 
One of the tools that most judges already allow is to permit jurors 
to take notes, particularly in a long case. Another option that a few 
judges, but not very many, allow is to permit jurors to actually ask 
questions during the case: they can give a question to the judge by 
passing him a note. If he concludes that it is a relevant question, he 
will then pose it to counsel or the witness in order to clear up some of 
the jurors’ misunderstanding. (No judge that I know of allows a juror 
to jump up, raise their hand, and say, “I want to know something 
from a witness,” that could be pretty disruptive.) In the few cases in 
which I have been involved where such note-passing has been 
permitted it has been a great help because it allows the attorney to 
find out and address what is at the heart of the jurors’ concern instead 
of sitting there trying to figure out what a juror is thinking, and 
usually doing a terrible job of figuring it out. 
One of the very first cases I had as a young lawyer was an 
antitrust case in which I was representing the defendant. It was about 
a three-month trial and there was one juror, an older woman, who fit 
the profile of a good defense juror: educated, owned stock, and 
participated in mutual funds (hopefully a mutual fund that owned our 
client’s stock, we thought). She seemed like she would be a great 
juror on paper and, sure enough, throughout the trial she would nod at 
us and smile when we were making points. After the case was over 
and we won, though with a directed verdict from the judge (so the 
case never got to the jury), we interviewed the jurors. This particular 
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woman was absent from the interviews and we asked the other jurors, 
“Well, were we right, did she really like us? Was she really on our 
side?” They said, “Oh, Mrs. X, she was senile. Nobody paid any 
attention to her. She didn’t have a clue what was going on.” We all 
recognized that we cannot figure out what jurors are thinking about 
and, if we can find a way to get the jurors to communicate with us in 
an organized way, we will do a better job of addressing their issues 
and get more consistent justice. If we get more consistent justice we 
will have a more practical application of the rule of law. 
Another thing that a few judges do to assist juries in their 
decision-making process is to allow interim statements by lawyers to 
the jury. Generally, lawyers only speak directly to the jury twice: in 
the opening statement and in closing arguments. In a three- or four-
month trial those statements can get lost. Certainly the opening 
statements can get lost, particularly if you represent a defendant when 
a plaintiff goes on for six or eight weeks. If you have the ability to 
make interim statements you can try to keep the jury focused on the 
points you want to make. You can respond to points that are made. 
You can try to put things in perspective.  
Many dramatic things happen in trials, and those dramatic events 
are great fun for the lawyers. Occasionally they even provide some 
amusement for the judge. Put in proper context this can often play an 
important role in revealing bias, inconsistencies, or even a lack of 
candor. However, without the proper context, they can be potentially 
disruptive to the rule of law because they are something that 
potentially focuses the jury, and sometimes the judge, on an issue that 
is very dramatic but actually peripheral to the central issues in the 
case. 
In the Microsoft antitrust case I represented the Department of 
Justice and we had two things to prove. First, we had to prove that the 
defendant had monopoly power. Second, we had to prove that the 
defendant acted in an anti-competitive way. We had to do both. 
Merely having monopoly power is not an antitrust violation. In the 
Microsoft case each side had an expert witness and we each had one 
of the best economic experts in the country. I had picked one, they 
had picked one, and we had both picked the one that the other would 
have had if we were making a second choice. These were very, very 
experienced expert witnesses—first-rate economists who had gotten 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/5
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numerous awards and were very articulate, persuasive presenters. 
When Microsoft’s case began we made some points, as plaintiffs 
typically do, and the defense wanted to, I believe, reverse the 
momentum. So they took a bold step that many lawyers would not 
have taken: they put their economist, their only economist, on the 
witness stand first. Economists are very important in an antitrust case 
because so much of the case depends on how you interpret the 
principles of economics and the economic data. If they were 
successful with their economist they could really change the 
momentum of the case. If they were unsuccessful with their first 
witness they would be in a deep hole because they would not have an 
economist to bat clean-up, which is often the way economists are 
used in such cases. When the time came for me to cross examine 
Microsoft’s economist I knew that I needed to make some substantial 
points and try to damage the aura of credibility that he had quite 
successfully built up because of his background, experience, and 
qualifications.  
One of the subjects I addressed with him was the extent to which 
profits were an indication of monopoly power. Microsoft had very 
high profits and if I could get him to admit a connection it would be 
an important piece of evidence. He responded that profits were 
irrelevant to the issue of monopoly power. I then asked him a 
question that might have alerted him, but did not, as to whether he 
had ever thought that profits were relevant to the issue of monopoly 
power. Again, he said no. He had previously pointed out that my own 
expert did not think that there was a significant relationship between 
profits and monopoly power—which was true and why I had not 
asked my expert that question when I was examining him. I then 
showed the defense’s expert a copy of a Harvard Law Review article 
written by him in which he said that one of the three indications of 
monopoly power was persistently high profits. I handed him the 
article and he looked at it, looked back up at me, looked back at the 
article, looked back up at me, and finally shook his head and said, 
“What could I have been thinking of?” And that was just the reaction 
of the courtroom. For the rest of the trial he was known as the What 
Could I Have Been Thinking of Expert. Now that was a mistake. It 
was a mistake in preparation. It was an unacceptable mistake 
because, while you can miss some things that experts have written 
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because everybody writes so much nowadays, it is hard to miss 
something in the Harvard Law Review. I did not go to Harvard but it 
still prints a well-recognized law review and it is one of the places 
you look. It was great for me and my client but it was not necessarily 
the kind of thing that ought to itself decide the merits of the case. It 
was proper examination. It was important examination. It went to 
credibility, and credibility is important. But the advantage of having 
the ability to get up and talk about what has just happened and try to 
explain the significance from each side’s perspective allows the jury 
to stop and think it and to see beyond the dramatic, interesting event 
to what they are really after: the truth.  
Since the Microsoft case was a bench trial each side had the 
opportunity to argue the significance (or insignificance) of evidence 
as we went along. Similar opportunities in a jury case could help 
jurors put courtroom occurrences in context while understanding the 
importance of what they are hearing.  
Another example of the benefits of having the ability to place 
things into context in a trial from the Microsoft case occurred when 
Microsoft called their second witness. He was a good witness for 
them, and an unbelievably tough witness to cross examine. His name 
was Paul Maritz. The third witness they put on was initially even 
better. He was one of their top executives, a very highly skilled 
technologist and he came with a killer videotape. We were saying 
that Microsoft had violated the antitrust laws by combining the 
operating system which they already had a monopoly on with a 
browser in order to lock out other competitive browser companies. 
His videotape showed two things. It showed that by combining the 
operating system with the browser you were able to accomplish great 
new things for consumers. He also showed that if you tried to add 
somebody else’s browser to it the system deteriorated, slowing down. 
When my turn came to cross examine him I did a pretty good job 
of demolishing the first of those points because I was able to show 
that you could get every one of the nice things that he talked about by 
using a stand-alone operating system and a stand-alone browser, 
thereby allowing the consumer to choose which browser to put on 
their computer. Exactly the same results were achieved so you did not 
have to tie them together.  
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However, I did not know what to do with his second point. We 
could not figure out how he had accomplished this result. We had 
experts of our own attempt it; they had not been able to succeed. One 
thought that occurred to me was to get up and say, “Now you didn’t 
really do this did you, because I tried and I couldn’t,” but I thought 
that probably would not work. He would probably say, “I did it 
because I know how to do this; you don’t, Mr. Boies.” 
So I did what you do sometimes: I decided not to cross examine 
him on that point. I thought we had made a fair amount of progress 
with his first point and that his credibility had been damaged because 
he had made it appear to the judge that you needed to link these 
things together to get the benefits and we demonstrated that was not 
true. So I made the decision to drop the cross examination and, if 
Microsoft had not done any redirect, the poor son-of-a-bitch would 
have been free to go home. Microsoft, however, elected to do a 
redirect that lasted more than an hour, which meant we broke for the 
evening. They also elected to hold a press conference and tell 
reporters that I had been afraid to cross examine the witness about 
this critical point and that tomorrow they were going to go back and 
show the judge just how important that was. Now after hearing that, 
we worked all night. I did not work all night, but people worked all 
night trying to figure it out. But when I left for court the following 
morning we still did not have an answer. Fortunately, by the morning 
break these people had enough information to allow me to do a cross 
examination. 
In the courtroom we had a huge screen on which we played 
depositions and showed documents. We took the witness’s videotape 
and I played the relevant portion, which was only four and one-half 
minutes long in its entirety, so the judge would have the situation in 
context. The witness had testified that this was a single computer and 
that nothing had happened to it. All they had done was switch the 
browsers. No programs had changed. No programs had been added. It 
was just the computer and the programs that consumers received 
straight out of the box. I then played the tape for about forty-five 
seconds and I froze it. In the upper left-hand column of a computer 
screen icons are listed which represent programs, and I could not tell 
then and I cannot tell now, what those icons meant. But I could count, 
at least up to five, and in the second column there were three icons 
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and I pointed this out to the witness and he said, “Yes, there are three 
icons.” And the judge is sort of looking at me, like he was thinking 
“Yeah, and what is the point of that?” I then played the tape for 
another thirty or forty seconds and froze it, directing the witness’s 
attention to that same column. Now there were only two icons there. I 
asked the witness to explain how that could happen and he did not 
have an explanation because he agreed with me that programs cannot 
just disappear in the middle of a running computer. I then played the 
tape for another forty-five seconds and froze it again. At this point 
every eye in the courtroom goes up to that column and the third icon 
has reappeared. The courtroom was completely silent and in that 
silence we could hear one of the lawyers at the Microsoft table 
whisper, “Oh, shit.” 
What they ultimately admitted was that this was not one computer 
running; it was actually a series of tapes that had been spliced 
together to accomplish this impression. Now, again, that is one of 
those dramatic moments that we all love in a courtroom, and I think it 
did say something important about credibility. It is also, however, the 
kind of thing that, with a jury, could arguably be blown out of 
proportion and overwhelm some of the other evidence. Either way it 
is the kind of testimony that you would want the ability to get up and 
try to explain, to argue the significance or insignificance of it. And I 
suggest that, if you are interested in the justice system, allowing this 
period of explanation is something that can be advantageous to the 
judicial process. 
CONCLUSION 
We do have juries. We are going to have juries for a long time. 
We need to try to figure out ways not to just criticize the jury system, 
not to debate whether you should have juries or not, but to determine 
how we make the jury system better. Like judicial supremacy, like 
judicial independence, like the quality of judging, the capability of 
jurors to deal with these kinds of complex issues is critical to the rule 
of law and the rule of law is critical to all of us.  
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